Author Archives: Antoni Filipowski

Wall or Door? Amazon and Walmart Are Both Right (For Themselves)

Reading Time: 4 minutes

Picture telling your AI assistant: “order milk and toilet paper.” At Walmart, the agent will soon be allowed to do it. At Amazon, it walks straight into a wall. Within about a month, America’s two retail giants gave opposite answers to one question: who owns the moment a customer decides to buy? I won’t crown a winner. I think each company picked the answer that fits where it stands, and copying the other would be a mistake.

What actually happened

In September, Amazon started blocking Meta’s Muse agent from shopping for users on Amazon.com. On 21 October, Walmart went the other way and announced three things:

  • Agent Gateway: a direct connection (built on MCP) that lets agents search Walmart’s inventory and buy.
  • Agent Profiles: every agent gets its own profile inside your account. You approve each purchase or set a spending limit (Walmart’s examples are $50, $100 and $200).
  • Terms for AI agents: approval is on by default, no card details, nothing beyond what the shopper asked for. Rule breakers get blocked.

Walmart already works with Muse, ChatGPT and Gemini. Best line of the announcement: “We price products, not people.”

Why the wall makes sense for Amazon

Amazon’s official line is about its rules: shopping agents must identify themselves as bots, and Amazon says Muse didn’t. But I’d follow the money. Amazon made $19.6 billion from advertising in Q3 2026 alone, up 12% year on year. A big chunk of that comes from brands paying to show up at the top of your search results.

An AI agent doesn’t scroll, and a “Sponsored” badge doesn’t tempt it. It just picks. If agents do the shopping, the paid slot loses its audience. Data works the same way: when an agent shops for you, Amazon’s clicks happen somewhere else. So Amazon wants agentic shopping to happen inside its own store and its own AI assistant, where it controls the ranking and the ads.

When you’re the online leader with a huge ad business and customer data to protect, a closed gate is a sensible default. The law is a bit wobbly, though. Amazon sued Perplexity over its Comet assistant shopping through Amazon accounts. In March 2026 a district court gave Amazon a preliminary injunction. In August the Ninth Circuit vacated it: “it was the user who ‘accessed’ Amazon’s computers.” It’s an early ruling and the contract claims are still open, but the wall is less solid than Amazon hoped.

Why the door makes sense for Walmart

Open doesn’t mean uncontrolled. Walmart decides who gets in, what they see (no card numbers) and how much they can spend. The customer account stays with Walmart. It’s a classic platform move: you don’t own every screen, but you own the rules.

Walmart is the challenger online. It has less to lose when agents skip its ad slots and more to gain from being the store those agents find easy. Walmart sells ads too, so it is betting that reach beats ad margin. Agent Profiles were promised “in the next month.” Announcing is easy. Shipping is harder.

Don’t swallow the forecast whole

Morgan Stanley estimates agents could handle about 10% of US online retail by 2030, up to 20% in the optimistic case: $190 to $385 billion in spending. I’m not buying it as a given.

First, that range is huge. When the top end is double the bottom end, the honest summary is “we don’t know.” It also dates from late 2025, before Amazon blocked Muse or Walmart opened up.

Second, Morgan Stanley also estimated that roughly 23% of Americans had bought something through AI in the past month. That’s the bank’s own estimate, worked out from adoption rates, not a count of actual shoppers. And it clashes with Andy Jassy saying outside agents aren’t meaningfully affecting the ad business, because “few customers are doing much shopping this way yet.” Jassy runs the company with the wall, so he’s not neutral either. Still, I find him more believable for today. If nearly a quarter of Americans shopped through AI every month, I’d expect Amazon’s ad business to feel it. It still grew 12%.

My opinion, not a fact: forecasts from banks tend to lean optimistic about hot trends. If the forecast is too high, Amazon’s wall is less risky for longer.

My take

This is the textbook walled garden vs open platform fight, live. Which is smarter? It depends where you start. Amazon is protecting the business model it already has: ads and data, earned inside its own interface. Walmart is preparing for the interface it expects, where customers talk to ChatGPT or Gemini instead of opening a store’s app, and as the challenger it can afford the experiment. Platform strategy follows market position. If Walmart copied the wall, it would be guarding a castle it doesn’t have yet. If Amazon copied the door, it would be putting its ad business at risk to chase a trend Jassy says hasn’t arrived.

What would change my mind:

  • Agent shopping grows fast, and Amazon’s own numbers start to show it. Then the wall gets riskier.
  • Amazon later opens a paid “approved agents only” entrance. That’s pure speculation, but it would mean even the leader needed a door, just with a ticket booth.

Until then, wall for the leader, door for the challenger. Both are right, and the mistake would be swapping them.

Sources

AI engine used: Claude Sonnet (Anthropic)

Prompts used:

  1. “Suggest 5 recent tech news topics I could write a Management in E-economy blog post about, from new gadgets to AI and platforms, as long as there’s something to debate.” I picked Amazon blocking AI shopping agents while Walmart lets them in.
  2. “Research it using only primary sources and established news outlets: what each company announced, the key numbers, the Amazon vs Perplexity case, and who argues for and against each approach.”
  3. “Write a casual first-person blog post on whether Amazon’s wall or Walmart’s open door is the better strategy. I think neither is simply smarter, it depends where each company starts: Amazon is the leader protecting a huge ad business, Walmart is the challenger online with less to lose. Don’t just repeat the sources, question the ones that sound too optimistic. Around 900 words, 5 sources.”
  4. “Fact-check every number, date, quote and link, and point out any weak arguments.”

You Can Outsource Your Servers, Not Your Blame

Reading Time: 4 minutes

On Tuesday morning, 20 October, at 07:08 UK time, Google Cloud’s London region was hit by what Google calls a “power event”. Within hours, Revolut customers across Europe and beyond couldn’t pay with their cards, send money or even log in. That evening Revolut said the issue was fixed and pointed at “a recent Google Cloud outage”. Technically true. But I think it’s the wrong answer, and UK rules agree with me.

What actually broke

Google’s status page puts it in one zone, europe-west2-b, and hasn’t said yet what actually failed. That’s one of three zones in London, which is Google’s only UK region. Google listed 38 affected products and an incident of about 7 hours 52 minutes. It said the power event itself was “mitigated” at 12:12 UK time, and by 15:03 the outage was “mitigated for most of the customers”.

Revolut is a different story. Its status page flagged 28 services as partially unavailable, from sign-ins and card payments to transfers, FX and stock trading. Revolut’s message that “The issue has now been fixed, and services are now restored” only came at around 18:50 UK time. That’s almost four hours after Google said things were fine for most of its customers. The bank says “all our customers’ money and data are safe”, which is nice, but you also kind of want to use the money.

And it’s not a small app. Revolut has more than 80m customers, around 13m of them in the UK, and it’s reportedly worth over $120bn.

“It was Google” is not a defence anymore

This is the part I find most interesting. In March 2026 Revolut finally became a fully licensed UK bank. That gets you FSCS protection for eligible deposits, but it also means the full set of PRA and FCA rules for banks.

One of those is operational resilience. Since 31 March 2025, UK firms have had to show they can keep their important services within set “impact tolerances” during a disruption. The idea behind it is simple: if you outsource something, you still own the outcome. The regulator doesn’t care whose server caught fire. The FCA said it pretty directly: “People need to be able to access their money and make payments.” It added that it expects firms “to fix issues quickly, keep their customers informed and ensure no one is left out of pocket.” Customers in the EU bank with Revolut’s Lithuanian entity, so UK rules don’t cover them, but the EU’s DORA rules (in force since January 2025) say much the same thing: the firm stays fully responsible even when it uses a tech provider.

Blaming Google is a bit like a restaurant blaming its fridge supplier for food poisoning. Maybe the fridge broke. You still served the food.

SLAs are not accountability

Revolut has a big multi-year deal with Google Cloud. A deal like that comes with an SLA, and an SLA usually gives you service credits when things go wrong. Credits are a discount on your next invoice. They don’t make it up to annoyed customers, and they don’t answer the letter Treasury Committee chair Dame Meg Hillier sent to the Bank of England and FCA within hours, asking how many firms and customers were hit (first reply due by 4 November).

That’s the gap I mean. A contract moves money between two companies, but accountability towards customers and regulators stays with the bank. Vendor risk management is basically planning for that gap before it opens.

Why Revolut took hours longer than Google to recover hasn’t been explained. My guess (only a guess) is that restarting a bank’s systems in the right order and clearing backlogs just takes time. But a resilience plan is supposed to cover exactly that.

OK, but to be fair

Multi-cloud isn’t a magic button. Running a bank on two providers is expensive and complicated, and the extra complexity can cause its own failures. Some outages also ignore all your clever regional planning. Google’s June 2025 incident was a software bug that hit every region at once. AWS’s us-east-1 failure in October 2025 was a single region, yet it disrupted services worldwide. And with only one Google region in the UK, a bank that wants to keep data in the UK on Google has no second UK region to fail over to. In theory the two other London zones should take over when one fails, but Google’s own updates talk about recovering workloads across the whole London region, so it clearly wasn’t that clean.

Monzo, Revolut’s direct rival, runs a cut-down backup platform on Google Cloud that can keep core features like card payments and transfers going if its main AWS setup fails. So it’s a choice, not a law of physics.

My take

I think this is more a strategy question than a tech one. Revolut’s business model is speed: grow fast, ship features, chase 100m customers and maybe an IPO. One deep cloud partnership fits that, because you get scale and AI tools without building them yourself. The cost is concentration risk. A handful of US tech giants run most of the cloud market, and UK regulators now oversee the biggest ones directly. Google Cloud was put under direct UK oversight as a “critical third party” only in July, about three months before this outage.

But that oversight doesn’t take the job off Revolut’s desk. You can rent the platform, you can’t rent trust. If I were on Revolut’s board, I wouldn’t ask “why did Google fail?” I’d ask “why did we stay down for hours after Google was back?”

Sources

AI engine used: Claude Opus